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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-430 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES, ET ux. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[November , 1982] 
----------------
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. + 
Earlier this year the Court decided not to allow the Illinois 
Attorney General to argue the question it now asks the par-
ties to address. That decision was consistent with the 
Court's settled practice of not permitting a party to advance 
a ground for reversal that was not presented below. The re-
versal today of the Court's earlier decision is not only a fla-
grant departure from its settled practice, but also raises seri-
ous questions concerning the Court's management of its 
certiorari jurisdiction. I am therefore unable to join the 
Court's decision to order reargument of this case. 
I 
As a matter of ordinary procedure, the burdens of litiga-
tion are minimized and the decisional process is expedited if a 
court is consistent in its rulings as a case progresses. We set 
a poor example for other judges when we suddenly reverse 
our prior rulings in the same case. . 
On February 8, 1982, the State of Illinois filed a motion 
seeking leave to amend or enlarge the question presented for 
review in this case. The motion asked the Court to incorpo-
rate the following question: 
"Assuming, arguendo, that the information used to ob-
tain the search warrant did not satisfy Aguilar v. Texas, 
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378 U. S. 108 (1964), should the evidence obtained under 
the warrant nevertheless be admitted at trial because 
the police acted in a reasonable good faith belief in the 
validity of the warrant?" 
On March 1, 1982, the Court unanimously denied that mo-
tion. On October 13, 1982, the parties presented an hour of 
argument; they respected our decision and did not attempt to 
argue the question of good faith. Today, the Court asks the 
parties to reargue the case in order to address the very ques-
tion it would not allow the parties to argue last month. This 
type of inconsistent decisionmaking always imposes unnec-
essary costs on litigants and is wasteful of the judiciary's 
most scarce resource time. 
II 
As a matter of appellate practice, it is generally unde-
sirable to permit a party to seek reversal of a lower court's 
judgment on a ground that the lower court had no opportu-
nity to consider. 1 It is especially poor practice to do so when 
the basis for reversal involves a factual issue on which nei-
ther party adduced any evidence. Those considerations ap-
ply with special force when the judgment of the highest court 
of a sovereign state is being reviewed. 2 Each of these con-
1 Of course, there is no impediment to presenting a new argument as an 
alternative basis for affirming the decision below. E. g., Hankerson v. 
North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 240 n. 6 (1977). 
2 Writing for the Court in Cardinale v. Louisiana, 349 U. S. 437, Jus-
TICE WHITE made it clear that this view represents the Court's traditional 
stance. 
"The Court has consistently refused to decide federal constitutional issues 
raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions both before 
[Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368 (1836)], Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311, 
315 (1819), and since, e. g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Gro-
cers Assn., Inc., 360 U. S. 334, 342, ~· 7 (1959); State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U. S. 154, 160-163 (1945); McGoldrick v. 
Compagnie General Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434-435 (1940); Whit-
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siderations applies to the additional question on which the 
Court has ordered reargument. Neither party gave the Cir-
cuit Court of DuPage County, the Appellate Court of Illinois, 
Second District, or the Supreme Court of Illinois an opportu-
nity. to consider the question. Neither party offered any evi-
dence concerning the state of mind of the magistrate when he 
issued the warrant, the state of mind of the officers who ob-
tained the warrant, or the state of mind of the officers who 
executed the warrant. In short, the new issue was not 
"fairly presented" to the state courts. . Cf. Picard v. Con-
nor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971). 
III 
As a matter of power, the Court's action is subject to ques-
tion. That question is serious whether one assumes that the 
Illinois courts decided the Fourth Amendment question cor-
rectly or incorrectly. 
On the one hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court of 
Illinois correctly decided the only federal question that was 
presented to it, 3 this Court has a duty to affirm its judgment. 
See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 
(1937). If the only federal question presented by a certiorari 
petition is unworthy of review, or does not identify a legiti-
ney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 362--363 (1927); Dewey v. DesMoines, 173 
U. S. 193, 197-201 (1899); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 
(1875). 
* * * 
"Questions not raised below are those on which the record is very likely to 
be inadequate, since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in 
mind." 394 U. S., at 438-439. 
See also New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308, 317 (1937); Wil-
son v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474, 483-484 (1946); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 
653, 677-682 (WHITE, J., concurring). See generally R. Stern & E. Gress-
man, Supreme Court Practice 456-465 (5th ed. 1978). 
3 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits a magistrate from issuing a search warrant on the basis of an affida-
vit such as that filed by the police officer in this case. 
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mate basis for reversal, this Court has no power to grant cer-
tiorari Simply because it would like to address some other 
federal question. For neither Article III of the Constitution 
nor the jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress vest this 
Court with any roving authority to decide federal questions 
that have not been properly raised in adversary litigation. 
On the other hand, if it is assumed that the Supreme Court 
of Illinois has incorrectly decided the federal question that 
was presented to it, this Court has a duty to reverse its judg-
ment. That duty could be performed by simply answering 
the question decided below, without reaching the additional 
question on which the Court orders reargument today. It is, 
of course, a settled canon of our constitutional jurisprudence 
that we do not decide constitutional questions unless it is nec-
essary to do so to resolve an actual case or controversy. See 
e. g., Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U. S. 
105, 122-127 (1981). 
Thus, however the Court resolves the merits of the federal 
question that has already been argued, the action it takes to-
day sheds a distressing light on the Court's conception of the 
scope of its powers. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
